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THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON
MULTILATERAL TRADE REGULATION AND
GOVERNANCE
THOMAS CoTrIER*
We cannot and should not put genies back in bottles. But we must
devote more of our attention to the public policy implications of
global technological development and integration.
FM. Abbott (1995)
INTRODUCTION
The last fifty years have seen dramatic changes in the develop-
ment of international law and relations: Decolonization substantially
increased the number of state actors but eventually affirmed classical
notions of sovereignty in an new era of international cooperation; the
advent of Human Rights as an international concern shaped new val-
ues and interventions in what formerly was considered a purely do-
mestic affair with the exception of minority rights. Yet, if I had to
choose the single most influential factor in international law, and in
particular in the regulation of economic activities since World War II,
it would be the progress of science and technology. This advance has
shaped both the substance of law and the way international law is
made, more so than the other factors such as the multiplication of
state and nonstate actors, theory, or valuational changes affecting
human behavior and conduct in international relations.'
In customary international law, the evolution of the continental
shelf doctrine2 in the Law of the Sea during the 1950s and 1960s, as
well as that of the exclusive economic zone 3 some twenty years later,
* Professor of European and International Economic Law, University of Berne.
I am indebted to my colleagues at the Berne Institute of European and International Economic
Law, Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, J.D, attorney-at-law, and Marc Stucki, LL.M., attorney-at-
law, for discussion, advice and suggestions.
1. Cf A.E. Gotlieb, The Impact of Technology on the Development of Contemporary Inter-
national Law, 170 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW I,
at 125-329 (1981).
2. See generally E.D. BROWN, THE LEGAL REGIME OF HYDROSPACE 3-78 (1971); R.R.
CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 108-22 (1983).
3. See generally DAVID JOSEPH ATTARD, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1989); FRANCESCO ORIEGO VICUf4A, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: REGIME
AND LEGAL NATURE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989); Anne Hollick, Note and Comment,
The Origins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 494-500 (1977).
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are among the most impressive recent examples of the effect of partic-
ular technologies on law. Like before when the advent of artillery
established the breadth of the territorial seas (the "cannon-ball rule"),
it was technology that brought about new claims and eventually the
emergence of new sovereign rights over natural resources. Without
new technologies to exploit off-shore oil and gas resources in the con-
tinental shelf, such legal development would not have taken place.
Without the advent of large factory-ship fishing operations and freez-
ing technologies, no need would have emerged to claim exclusive eco-
nomic zones.
In the specific field of treaty-based multilateral trade regulation,
a comparable observation can be made: when the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") was framed in 1947, there were rela-
tively few rules directly regulating technology or specific technologies.
Since the industrial revolution, however, it has been technology that
allows for the production of most products. A glance at tariff lines
demonstrates the immense variety of commercial products technology
has produced. Equally, technology allows for the relatively inexpen-
sive transportation of goods and services and accounts for an unprece-
dented growth of international trade since the end of World War II.
While world production quintupled, the amount of trade increased
fourteen times in the same period.4 For a long time, it simply did not
seem necessary to address particular technologies, or the specific
problems relating to technology, in the realm of the GATT.5 Sophisti-
cated technical advances, again, changed this perception in the 1970s.
First, it became necessary to enact multilateral regulations on techni-
cal barriers to trade in the GATT Tokyo Round. These rules directly
relate to technological requirements in order to ensure their safety
while at the same time avoiding protectionist barriers to the importa-
tion of similar and competing products. 6 Moreover, the production of
civil aircraft became the first sector of high-technology to be directly
4. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, TREND AND STATISTICS
15 (1995) (measured as real increases).
5. One, if not the only, example is Article IV of the GATT 1947 specifically regulating the
performance of cinematographic films and therefore an aspect of cultural services. We note that
the same is true for the elaborate 1948 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4
(1948). Beyond films, no provision was found which directly addresses particular technologies.
6. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, reprinted in THE TEXTS
OF THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS 1-25 (1986), amended by the Uruguay Round [hereinafter
TEXTS OF THE TOKYO ROUND]; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 138 (1994); see
also Agreement on the Applicatioit of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, id. at 69.
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addressed by a separate multilateral agreement. 7 Second, an entirely
new generation of technology-driven rules, discussed shortly, was
born during the GATT Uruguay Round. Third, the need for effective
rules on environmental protection increasingly emerged as a response
to the use of traditional and often hazardous technologies created and
applied before the coming age of sustainable development. 8 This
need will contribute to the shaping of future agendas of trade negotia-
tions within the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 9
This Paper seeks to explore some of the factors which led to an
enhanced influence of new technology in recent international trade
regulation before and during the Uruguay Round. It suggests that
both in the fields of intellectual property and in services, new technol-
ogies were the driving forces for establishing new rights and for seek-
ing enhanced market access. This Paper, however, not only is
interested in the substance of norms. It is equally interested in the
present and future problems of how such rules are brought about, and
what impact new technologies may have on what we may call "govern-
ance" or "multilateral governance" in international trade regulation. 10
I submit that new technologies are important for the substance of de-
cisions as well as for the structure of decision-making.
7. Tokyo Round Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, reprinted in TEXTS OF THE TOKYO
ROUND, supra note 6, at 181 (negotiations during the Uruguay Round did not produce amend-
ments to this plurilateral agreement).
8. See generally The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. U.N. Doc. A/
CN.151/5/Rev.1. reprinted in 31 Irrr'L L. MATERIALS 876 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration];
Agenda 21, reprinted in THE EARTH SUMMIT: THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRON-
MENT AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) 138 (Stanley P. Johnson ed.. 1993) (in particular see Chap-
ter 2(B), Making trade and environment mutually supportive).
9. See Decision, Trade and Environment, April 14, 1994, reprinted in 33 INT'L L. MATERI-
ALS 1267 (1994); see also subsequent work to be adopted at the 1996 Ministerial Meeting. For a
survey and discussion of trade related issues see, for example, THE GREENING OF WORLD
TRADE ISSUES (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992).
10. In contemporary international law and relations, "Governance" or "Good Governance"
is mainly used in the context of development projects and strategies, depicting governmental
qualities and conditions which are essential to bring about successful social and economic sus-
tainable development. It is a most promising approach, introducing-even if somewhat late-the
issue and importance of law, legal structures and processes into development programs. See gen-
erally THE WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE (1994); OECD,
PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT: FROM ADVOCACY TO ACTION (Hartmut Schneider & Marie-
Helene Libercrer eds., 1995); SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE (Konrad
Ginther et al. eds., 1995). Mutatis mutandis, the term, is of equal help in the present context. It
will help to frame essential structural and constitutional requirements of the multilateral trading
system. See infra pp. 428-435.
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I. TECHNOLOGY AND THE GENESIS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
AND GATS
Looking back at the genesis of the two new pillars of the WTO-
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS")" and the Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS")' 2-new technologies played an essential role in both.
While this was apparent in the field of intellectual property, it was a
less visible engine for the field of services.
A. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights
The importance of intellectual property rights ("IPRs") in inter-
national trade has been recognized for a long time. In fact, the nine-
teenth century's Paris and Berne Conventions13 were among the first
attempts to achieve multilaterally acceptable trade standards, long
before the GATT came into effect. Interestingly, however, these rules
never developed into customary international law. A comparison of
standards and rules of protecting investment and real property abroad
and IPRs protection reveals a complete absence of the latter in the
body of customary international law. No rules emerged with respect
to compensation for the expropriation of intellectual property or with
respect to the protection of trade secrets over the last decades. 14 It is
interesting and somewhat surprising to observe that customary law
still is silent, and, for example, does not provide any guidance for set-
tlement of IPR-related investment and trade disputes with states not
or not yet Members of the WTO.
It appears to be a matter of speculation whether this was an omis-
sion due to ignorance, or whether for a long time there simply was no
need to seek such protection in customary law. The history of at-
tempts to revise the Paris Convention, however, suggests that these
problems were well known, but that strategies focused exclusively on
11. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994. LEGAL INSTRUMENTS RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 365, 365-403
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
12. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 325, 325-64,
amended by The Second Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (S/L 11 of 24
July 1995) and Related Decisions, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 199, 199-205 (1996).
13. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, as last re-
vised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1883, as last revised at Paris, July 24 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
14. See J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks
of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 776-81, 796-800 (1989) (elaborating on
the obsolete distinction between tangible and intangible alien property).
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treaty law. Yet these strategies faced long-lasting LDC opposition at
the time of efforts towards a New International Economic Order in
the 1970s and 1980s, 15 before the change of previously hostile atti-
tudes to IPR protection 16 occurred during the Uruguay Round. This
change was induced by many factors-both related and unrelated to
IPRs-but it is fair to say that new technologies and the interest to
share and participate in them, were among the driving forces for the
developing countries to actively negotiate the TRIPS Agreement.1 7
Importantly, former policies of objecting to international rules of pro-
tection had not brought about the transfers of technology and the
stimulation of their economies that these countries had expected.
From the viewpoint of industrialized countries, the need to estab-
lish effective and enforceable standards of IPRs in Member States of
the WTO around the world became pressing for a number of reasons.
First, with the increasing integration of developed and developing
countries into the world market, it was no longer financially possible
to leave these markets without IPR protection comparable to that of
Western European and North American standards and traditions.
While it is true that the prime motivation to begin the TRIPS negotia-
tions can be found in the absence of adequate protection in LDCs, it
would be wrong to assume that the results are limited to North-South
relations. Quite the contrary. As the negotiations evolved, more and
more problems among industrialized countries emerged and became
the most difficult ones to overcome.
The need to promote IPR protection lies less in increasing trade
flows than in the nature and quality of new technological products.
Compared to the situation when the GATT was negotiated, the
amount of intellectual input and components subject to IPR protec-
tion has increased considerably. In the United States, for instance, it
was estimated that more than twenty-seven percent of U.S. exports
15. See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 12, 1974, UN (G.A. Res.
3281) (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251, 251-65 (1975). The thinking of that period is reflected in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (Kamal Hossain ed., 1980)
and INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (Paul de Waart et al. eds., 1988).
16. See, e.g., C. RAGHAVAN, RECOLONIZATION: GATT, THE URUGUAY ROUND & THE
THIRD WORLD 114 (1990) (efforts by industrialized countries "aimed at constricting [LDCs']
process of industrialization and autonomous development").
17. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellec-
tual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
689, 689-775 (1989); Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protec-
tion in Developing Countries, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1245, 1245-81 (1994); Thomas Cottier,
The Prospects for Intellectual Property in GATT, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 383, 386-92 (1989);
Thomas Cottier, Intellectual Property in International Trade: the GATT Connection, 47 Swiss
REV. INT'L ECON. REL. 79, 88-94 (1992).
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contain intellectual property components while the rate was less than
ten percent when the GATT was negotiated. 18 The value of IPR-pro-
tected products exported increased from $7.5 billion in 1986 to some
$20 billion in 1992.19 Perhaps even more important is the fact that
new technologies, requiring high investment in research and develop-
ment, can be reproduced and copied relatively easily-again thanks to
new technologies. New chemical entities and pharmaceuticals, com-
pact discs, integrated circuits, and soft-ware immediately come to
mind. It was estimated in 1986 that some $50 billion were lost in the
United States due to inadequate IPR protection abroad. 20
Much of the effort to enhance protection in the TRIPS negotia-
tions was aimed at avoiding such losses through substantive standards
and procedural rules assuring effective enforcement in national legal
systems. Upon implementation, it may be expected that intellectual
property not only will be better protected, but also that the TRIPS
Agreement will foster and facilitate new technologies and their use
around the world. This is also of particular importance for the promo-
tion of technologies for sustainable development in industrialized and
developing countries alike.
New technologies also induce qualitative changes in the regime of
IPRs. The TRIPS Agreement was not merely a matter of transposing
existing national rules or rules contained in other conventions into the
GATT-WTO system. It was often necessary to create new rules for
protecting intellectual property. In some areas, new technology chal-
lenges existing patterns and makes the interface of different legal tra-
ditions necessary. In the field of copyright, novel technologies and
structures change continental European droit d'auteur which is tradi-
tionally centered on the individual rather than corporate needs. They
increasingly shift the emphasis from protecting individual authors and
their works to overall regulation of industrial activities. The transition
to, and interface with, Anglo-American copyright law (and vice-versa)
remains a major challenge.
The legal changes incurred with TRIPS are of paramount impor-
tance to the trading system. They may indicate that-after policies of
18. See R. Michael Gadbaw, Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or Mar-
riage of Convenience?, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223, 229 (1989).
19. See generally Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, Intellectual Property Rights are a Growing Source of Export Revenues 1986-1992
(on file with author).
20. See U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Pub. No. 2065, I.T.C. Foreign Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights and the Effects on the U.S. Industry and Trade (1988); see also Abbott. supra
note 17, at 699-702.
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interventions and state ownership and expropriation became largely
matters of the past-the protection of intellectual property has re-
moved traditional customary law protection of investment and real
estate as the primary guarantee to attract and secure foreign invest-
ment and trade. To a large extent, this shift is caused by the ubiqui-
tous nature of intellectual property (i.e., its simultaneous presence in
different places), new technologies, and their importance in a highly
competitive world market.
B. The General Agreement on Trade in Services
The impact of new technologies in the genesis of the GATS is less
obvious, but was nevertheless an important driving force.2' The ad-
vent of modem tools of electronic and satellite communication sub-
stantially reduced the costs of transporting data22 and created global
markets. It facilitated the control of business operations abroad even
more so than before-when air travel first rendered the world a much
smaller place. Without such technologies, potentials to provide serv-
ices abroad, and therefore the drive to seek liberalization of market
access for an ever-increasing service industry, would have hardly
gained such prominence. While the GATS covers all services, it was
industries using modern technologies that were at the forefront of the
search for a framework agreement for a long-term liberalization of
market access. It is not a coincidence that the liberalization of serv-
ices directly based on human resources, such as labor, was met with
opposition from industrialized countries unwilling to open their mar-
kets for providers of labor from low-income countries. 23
II. THE REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
While new technologies considerably contributed to the enlarge-
ment of the WTO-GATT multilateral trading system, the regulatory
challenges caused by these new technologies are far from met.
21. See, e.g., J.V. Reyna, Services, in 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING
HISTORY (1986-1992) 2335, 2342 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993)("The technological advances in
the 1960s, particularly in the area of electronics and computers, spurred the growth of interna-
tional trade in services.").
22. Technologically reduced costs of transportation of data is considered a major factor in
enhancing trade in services. See P. Zweifel, Overview and Synthesis, in SERVICES IN SWITZER-
LAND: STRUCTURE, PERFORMANCE, AND IMPLICATIONS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
3 (P. Zweifel ed., 1993).
23. Negotiations will continue on this subject. See Decision on Negotiations on Movement
of Natural Persons, 31 INT'L L. MATERIALS 458-59 (1992).
1996]
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A. Genetic Engineering (Biotechnology)
It is generally agreed that genetic engineering or modern biotech-
nology is a member of the group of so-called "key" technologies. 24
Scientific and technological leadership in biology, nutrition, agricul-
ture, and medical sciences will largely depend on it in the twenty-first
century.25 How do these technologies affect the international trading
system and multilateral trade regulation? To a considerable extent, ex-
isting rules and experiences will apply to this field as they do in other
areas (such as general principles of WTO law and the rules on techni-
cal barriers to trade and phytosanitary measures). The same holds
true for labelling. Biotechnology, however, raises a number of new
and value-laden issues not yet resolved: biological safety, IPRs, and
property rights on nonmodified genetic resources.
The release of genetically modified plants, microorganisms, and
animals calls for safety standards in order to protect the public from
potential health hazards. Moreover, beyond the scientific dimension,
the problem has important psychological and ethical sides. No inter-
nationally agreed-upon standards exist so far beyond the emerging
precautionary principle,26 either within or outside of the WTO. Na-
tional regulations rely upon recommendations either by national bod-
ies and/or by international organisations, in particular by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD").27
Although there are obligations to negotiate and to seek common
standards, in particular in the Convention on Biodiversity, 28 efforts to
achieve such standards are protracted. It is likely that countries like
the United States and others, which are seeking to keep relatively
open and favorable conditions to attract investment and research ac-
tivities, enjoy a comparative edge against Europe where the public at
large is generally more skeptical, if not hostile about biotechnology.
24. See, e.g., LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMIC BATTLE AMONG
JAPAN, EUROPE, AND AMERICA 45 (1992).
25. See P. KENNEDY, PREPARING FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 65-81 passim (1993).
26. Rio Declaration, supra note 8, at 879, Principle 15 ("Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postpon-
ing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.").
27. Of particular importance was the 1986 OECD report Recombinant DNA Safety Con-
siderations (OECD Doc. 9386021) and the 1992 report Safety Considerations for Biotechnology
(OECD Doc. 9391051). For a comprehensive survey see M.F. Cantley, The Regulation of Mod-
ern Biotechnology: A Historical and European Perspective, in 12 BIOTECHNOLOGY: MULTIVOL-
UME COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE 505-795 (D. Brauer ed., 1995).
28. Convention on Biological Diversity. June 5, 1992. at Art. 14, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818,
827-28 (1992).
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International harmonization of opinion is impeded by the competing
strength of both publics. Public policies on biosafety therefore, be-
yond the minimal rules expressed by the precautionary principle and
customary international law (such as Trail Smelter arbitration stan-
dards) 29 may well remain a matter of national or regional legislation.
Things are different with respect to the patenting of biotechno-
logical inventions. Differing national rules on patenting create trade
distortions. A prohibition on obtaining a patent paradoxically has the
effect that inventions made abroad can be freely used-not only in
research, but also as a basis for the commercialization of a product
derived thereof. Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement bars the com-
mercialization of products in any country in which the grant of the
patent was denied. This is a new and still often ignored innovation
which does not yet exist in national or regional patent regulation. Yet
even with this prohibition, it is evident that industries and govern-
ments are deeply interested in achieving harmonized rules. While the
rules allow a foreign producer to bar commercialization of unpatented
competing domestic products, the same rules also bar the importation
and commercialization of unpatented foreign products. Obviously, ef-
forts to avoid such nontariff barriers will have to be undertaken if seri-
ous trade disputes are to be avoided in the next century.
The issue of patenting life forms will therefore remain on the
agenda of the WTO. The Agreement requires a review process of the
issue by the year 2000.30 In particular, Members of WTO will need to
examine the public policy goals of the general exception that prohibits
all plants and animals, except microorganisms, from being patented.
Despite obligations to provide for other forms of plant variety protec-
tion, the exclusions will limit patent protection and cause problems in
future years for the trade-related reasons stated above. On the other
hand, the issue involves difficult ethical problems. In Switzerland, for
example, which strongly depends on favorable conditions for research
and development as its main edge in a globalizing economy, there is
an initiative pending that, inter alia, would prohibit the patenting of
life forms.3' In the same strain, the European Parliament rejected a
29. Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, Decision, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939); Trail Smelter
Arbitral Tribunal, Decision, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941). On standards in customary law see
PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 88-89
(1992).
30. TRIPS Agreement, 1947, § 5, art. 27(3)(b).
31. See Botschaft tiber die Volksinitiative "zum Schutz von Leben und Umwelt vor
Genmanipulation (Gen-Schutz-Initiative)" 6. June 1995, Gov't. Doc. 95.044, 36 Bundesblatt
(Federal Reporter) vol. III 1333 (1995).
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first directive in 1995, adopted by the Council, that would have ex-
panded the patenting of life forms.32
These problems will not be easy to solve on a global scale. It is
perhaps the first time that international economic regulation is con-
fronted with profound ethical problems caused by new technologies
(as security policies have been in the nuclear age); and so far there is
little experience in dealing with this dimension of public policy issues
on the international level. The question arises whether the trading
system is in a position to address and solve these issues with tradi-
tional modes of international diplomatic decision-making.
With regard to LDCs, the issue of the patenting of life forms will
depend on yet another, equally difficult problem related to the new
technology. National and international intellectual property law, cre-
ated in and for a technological age, honors innovation by the applica-
tion of technical rules. No such property titles exist for genetic
resources cultivated over time through custom and experience. In
light of the fact that some ninety percent of all genetic resources of
potential interest can be found in LDCs, it is likely that advances in
international rules on patenting life forms, necessary for biotechnol-
ogy, can only be achieved after establishing an equitable balance with
property rights on existing, non-modified resources. How such rights,
often called farmers rights, can be introduced and to whom they
should be allocated, has been under discussion in the Food and Agri-
culture Organization 33 and was included in a United Nations draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 34
32. The European Parliament rejected the directive on the legal protection of biotechno-
logical inventions, reprinted in 1993 O.J. (C 44) 36 as amended (see Bull de l'Union europdenne
3/95 1.3.17 at 16), by 188 yes, to 240 no and 23 abstentions on 1 March 1995. See O.J. (C 68
20.3.95) 25/26. A revised draft was submitted by the Commission on 13 December 1995,
(COM(95) 661), in particular excluding patenting of human life forms and introducing farmers'
privileges. See Bull. de l'Union europdenne 12/1995 1.3.29 at 70.
33. See FAO Res. 4/89, reprinted in CPGR-Exl/94/lnf 1, at 7; Resolution 3 of the Confer-
ence for the adoption of the agreed text of the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted May
22, 1992 mentions farmers' rights among outstanding matters for future work, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 846-47 (1992). See generally BIOTECHNOLOGY AND FARMERS' RIGHTS: OPPORTUNITIES
AND THREATS FOR SMALL-SCALE FARMERS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Hans Brouwer et al.
eds., 1992).
34. Art. 29 and 30 (entitlement to control cultural and intellectual property, to control,
develop and protect science, technologies, and cultural manifestations, including human and
other genetic resources; entitlement to free and informed consent prior to approval of any pro-
ject affecting resources of indigenous peoples, entitlement to just and fair compensation), United
Nations, Economic and Social Council, Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities on its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2
(1995), reprinted in 34 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 546, 553 (1995).
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Conceptually the problem is a difficult one and is still in its begin-
ning stages. We are talking here of creating-because of new technol-
ogies-entirely new concepts of private property rights. This is
perhaps the most telling contemporary example of how modern tech-
nology affects the very foundations of the traditional legal orders and
contemporary international law based on individual and private prop-
erty rights.
In my view, it will be necessary to develop such farmers' rights
within trade regulations and relate them to traditional protection of
intellectual property.35 First, because it is a matter of equity and gen-
eral fairness in North-South relations. Second, because it provides a
basis of cooperation in the collection and analysis of genetic resources.
Third, from the realist point of view often defended in business life,
because progress in patenting life forms around the world will hardly
proceed without regulating property rights of nonmodified resources
from which biotechnologically induced benefits are obtained.
B. New Communication Technologies.
Communication has been essential for international trade since
the advent of trade routes and maritime navigation. Postal services,
the telephone, telegraph, and facsimile, and air travel revolutionized
communications. Today, another generation of communication is
evolving-computer-assisted communication. Multimedia and inter-
national networks, such as the Internet and the World Wide Web,36
offer new opportunities for interactive communication. It is evident
that the control of such technologies will be equally decisive as bio-
technology in shaping economic leadership and the equation of power
among nations. 37 Yet, it is not clear what their impact on international
trade and trade flows will be. Certainly, where available, such tech-
nologies reduce transaction costs: they decentralize information and
business opportunities; they make information and global interaction
available virtually instantaneously; and presumably they will consider-
35. See Thomas Cottier, Current and Future Issues Relating to the TRIPS Agreement: A
European Perspective, in AIPPI, XXXXVIe Congr~s de Montreal 1995, Workshops I-X, 83, 89-
91 (J.D. Meissner ed., 1995); Thomas Cottier, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: A
Requirement for Technology Cooperation, Foreign Investment and Equitable Returns in Biotech-
nology Prospecting, in BIOTECHNOLOGIE FOR ENTWICKLUNGSLANDER: CHANCEN UND RISIKEN
DER BIOTECHNOLOGIE BEI LANDWIRTSCHAFTLICHEN NUTZPFLANZEN 65-72 (1995).
36. For a brief history of the evolution of internet technology, from its beginnings at CERN,
Geneva in 1976 to its world-wide academic and commercial use see B.M. Segal, A Short History
of Internet Protocols at CERN (1995), <http://www.w3.org>.
37. See, e.g., Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & William A. Owens, America's Information Edge, 75/2
FOREIGN AFF. 20-36 (1996).
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ably contribute to economic growth and the increase of business trans-
actions. Further, they have the potential for fostering cooperation
and exchanges which could not or would not take place otherwise.
Competition also will be broadened to new scopes. Particularly
for services, the net enables sellers to reach buyers around the world,
and in turn gives buyers a never-before feasible opportunity to com-
parison shop. While the goods market is likely to become more re-
gionalized, due to internalized (and therefore higher) environmental
costs of transportation, the globe will become the market for invisible
services.
The legal nature of such communication networks might be
novel. They seem to be commercial services in the sense of GATS-
they are a privately-owned commercial system, accessible to paying
subscribers. They are still indirectly subsidized by universities around
the world who pay not only a periodic set fee and variable costs, but
also provide for part of the infrastructure. Equally, it is not entirely
clear today what the new technologies' impact will be on international
trade regulation. At present there are virtually no restrictions im-
posed on such networks. They are available world-wide wherever the
technical facilities are available. There is no need for liberalization in
the sense of GATS; rather, it is a matter of examining what public
policies need to be adopted, both nationally and internationally. In-
deed, global networks pose a host of unresolved legal issues: copy-
right, data protection, protection of privacy, and decency. 38
An interesting issue to explore for the specialist is whether these
technologies can still be meaningfully regulated on national or re-
gional levels. Given their worldwide and unlimited operation, will it
be necessary to provide multilaterally agreed-upon standards within
an international system? Do such rules fall within the ambit of WTO
law or within other bodies of law? Perhaps these new communication
technologies call for an entirely new kind of regulatory approach. Na-
tional boundaries no longer exist, and the regulatory instruments re-
lated to them (tariffs, quantitative restrictions) are therefore absent.
Neither do they require an establishment or a presence abroad, and
they can be delivered entirely through crossborder trade. On the
other hand, perhaps the new technology is really no different than
other communication methods such as telephone or telefax. Indeed,
38. See, e.g., Jonathan Cameron, Approaches to the Problems of Multimedia, 18 EUR. IN-
TELL. PROP. REV. 115 (1996); see also Sara John, What Rights Do Record Companies Have on the
Information Superhighway?, 18/2 EUR. INTELL PROP. REV. 74 (1996).
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noncontrolled discussions also can take place instantaneously over the
phone and written transactions can occur globally with the fax. Would
the transboundary nature of the new technologies make regulatory
systems similar to other transboundary legal issues-such as interna-
tional tax, criminal, or environmental law-helpful in formulating re-
sponses to complex legal and sensitive practical questions?
These are all questions for which we have no answers yet. They
are, however, important ones, and warrant study in all their various
aspects. I could well imagine, however, that the task is not one of
liberalizing old and rusty structures (such as in traditional telecommu-
nications), but rather is one of framing global public policies. This
would often have to occur without taking the time to pass through
national experiences in the first place, and would require entirely new
approaches within the multilateral trading system. The challenges for
rule-making processes are obvious.
C. Technology and Labor
New technologies always have tended to stir social unrest. The
term sabotage in French was created when weavers threw their
wooden shoes (sabbots) into the new weaving machines that had dras-
tically reduced labor opportunities. The experience of the
Unabomber in the United States is just another, albeit extreme, ex-
pression of this preoccupation.
Today, new electronically driven tools are about to produce the
same labor reductions in offices as have been occurring in manufactur-
ing. With high labor costs and international competition increasing,
businesses are forced to invest in capital-intensive equipment, thus
shifting employment opportunities from the many unskilled to the
fewer skilled. We are talking about an emerging two-tiered society in
industrialized countries. What is the impact of such evolutions on the
international trading system? Economics and conventional wisdom
may argue for abstaining from addressing such issues, and for continu-
ing to follow the principles of economically efficient allocations of
goods, services, capital, and investment. The question, however, is:
can an international trading system, shared by democracies and de-
pending on voters, afford to neglect the social costs that its very prin-
ciples threaten to impose?
The legitimacy and acceptance of relatively free trade, in the
long-term, will depend on evidence of whether it is providing happi-
ness not only to the few, but to the large majorities. We should not
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forget that the goal of full employment was the major concern of the
post-World War II negotiations under the auspices of the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Employment on the International
Trade Organization. 39 This goal stayed with the GAIT 40 and remains
a prime, and perhaps increasingly pressing, goal of the WTO. 41 Issues
such as labor rights keep emerging in trade talks for similar reasons.
42
They may provide the wrong answer; but the concern is real. Failure
to address the underlying issues of eroding workplaces for labor sup-
plies will result in new waves of protectionism and will eventually un-
dermine the fragile trading system. Again, technology raises
questions which traditional approaches to trade regulation cannot
answer.
III. THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON GOVERNANCE
A. The Shift of Powers
The regulatory challenges relating to biotechnology as well as to
new communications and to labor issues, yet to be explored, suggest
that the matter will possibly need to be regulated, at least in part,
multilaterally by international law. In other words, the trend, wit-
nessed in the past Uruguay Round, of intruding more and more into
domains which formerly pertained to national legislation will con-
39. See WTO, supra note 4. Realizing the aims set forth in the Charter of the United Na-
tions, particularly the attainment of higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of
economic and social progress and development, envisaged in Article 55 of that Charter, Purpose
and Objectives, Preamble, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization.
40. See GATT 1947, Preamble ("ensuring full employment").
41. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble at 9
GATT Doc. MTN/FA, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) ("Recognizing that their relations in the
field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, .... ").
42. See, e.g., Communications by the United States to the GATT Counsel, GATT Doc. L/
6196 (July 3, 1987) ("Trade which is based on denial of worker rights does not benefit workers in
either exporting or importing countries. It runs counter to the GATT objective of raising stan-
dards of living through expansion in the context of a liberal trading r6gime"). See also Commu-
nications by the United States to the GATT Council, GATT Doc. LJ6729 (Sept. 21, 1990)
(requesting, upon consultation, the establishment of a working party with a view to focus on
three basic rights: freedom of association; the right to organize and bargain collectively; and
freedom from forced labor). Reference to workers rights were not included in the Final Act of
the Uruguay Round. A compromise found with opposing LDCs included them in Chairman's
statement for further work. See AGENCE EUR., Apr. 8, 1994, at 8. France announced it would
push for this agenda in 1995, FT 2, Feb. 1995. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Fair Labor Stan-
dards and International Trade, 20/1 J. WORLD TRADE L. 61 (1986); Steve Charnovitz, The World
Trade Organization and Social Issues, 28/5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 17 (1994); D. Chambovey, Das
multilaterale Handelssystem und die Problematik der Arbeitsnormen (1995) (unpublished mimeo-
graph on file with author).
[Vol. 72:415
19961 MULTILATERAL TRADE REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE 429
tinue.43 Modes of regulation to be found in agricultural support sys-
tems and standard setting in the field of IPRs are likely to continue,
partly due to new technologies, partly because present and future bar-
riers to trade are mainly located within countries and regulated by
national law and practices.
The shift toward international legislation mainly induced by the
advent of new technologies raises a number of extremely difficult is-
sues, not only in terms of adequate substance (such as proper stan-
dards on patenting life forms). It also poses extremely difficult issues
on the structures and procedures by which such rules are created. In
all the fields where international standard setting becomes necessary
in order to sustain an open trading system, traditional, constitutional
models of legislation and democratic representation are challenged.
The more trade rules intrude on formerly domestic issues, the
more they need particular legitimacy in order to be successfully imple-
mented and enforced. It is a matter of time until similar discussions
on democratic deficits and democratic rule will emerge in the context
of the global trading system, as they exist in the context of the Euro-
pean Union,44 as they may exist tomorrow in the context of the North
American Free Trade Agreement and other free trade agreements,
and as they increasingly penetrate the realms of formerly domestic
legislation.
Today, the influence of national parliaments and democratic do-
mestic processes is eroding to the benefit of rule-making by executive
branches, diplomats, and experts. Perhaps this is not felt to the same
extent in the United States or the European Union as it is in many
other and smaller countries of the globe. These days, few states have
the privilege of remaining masters of treaties. The filling of these po-
sitions is virtually limited to hegemon powers which can afford to re-
ject multilateral trade agreements and pursue their interests by other
unilateral or bilateral means. From a realist, power-oriented point of
view, international trade rules and standards may therefore be per-
43. On the impact of globalization and internationalization on the nation-state and its new
functions within the international system, see generally PETER SALADIN, WOZU NOCH
STAATEN?: ZU DEN FUNKTIONEN EINES MODERNEN DEMOKRATISCHEN RECHTSSTAATS IN EINER
ZUNEHMEND OBERSTAATLICHEN WELT (1995).
44. Enhancing legitimacy through enhanced democracy and transparency is one of the ma-
jor goals of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union, see Commission
Report for the Reflection Group (1995); Reflection Group's Report of June 2, 1995, (March
1996) <http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/eu-docrefect/final.html>; the Maastricht II ne-
gotiating agenda Turin European Council 29 March 1996 Presidency Conclusions, (March 1996)
<http://europa.eu.int./en/record/turin.html>.
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ceived as an instrument of domination by a few, at the expense of the
self-determination and democratic governance of the many.
I do not suggest that this stage has yet been reached. The results
of the Uruguay Round passed smoothly in national constituencies
upon the ordinary bargaining process for internal compensations-
even in Switzerland where they were subject to a right of noncompul-
sory referendum, which did not materialize since the necessary
number of signatures calling for such a referendum failed to be col-
lected by opposing environmentalists and farmers. 45 But the impact
of new technologies and a presumably enhanced need for multilateral
regulation of formerly domestic affairs may alter the present overall
legitimacy and acceptance of WTO rules in the future. It may, in the
long term, result in a lower legitimacy of such rules. Consequently,
such rules may not stand up to serious political difficulties. Nobody
dedicated to a stable, rule-oriented trading system has an interest in
seeing the authority and legitimacy of international trade regulation
decline.
For such reasons, it is essential to focus on how such rules are
brought about. The structures of decision-making become as impor-
tant as the substance and quality of the rules. The latter, of course,
remains of prime importance. Bad rules destroy a system even if en-
acted in perfect structures. However, even good rules, formally ap-
proved but enacted in insufficient modes and ways, risk lacking
adequate legitimacy and support in implementation.
Currently, the main tenet of strengthening international trade
rules focuses on substance. "Constitutionalization" of trade rules is
perhaps the most prominent school of thought to that effect. Defining
market access in terms of individual rights, immune from arbitrary
and discretionary restrictions, and subject to judicial review by na-
tional and international courts is an important strategy, expounded in
particular by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann.46 Indeed, the experience
within the regional and supranational context of the European Union
(and much different from the Community's external relations) vividly
45. See Thomas Cottier & K. Nadakavukaren Schefer, Switzerland: The Challenge of Direct
Democracy, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND (J.H. Jackson & A. Sykes eds.,
forthcoming).
46. See Constitutional Problems of International Law, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 3-52 (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993);
see also. Limited Government and Unlimited Trade Policy Powers? Why Effective Judicial Re-
view and a Liberal Constitution Depend on Individual Rights, NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 537-61; Proposals For a New Constitution For the European
Union: Building-Blocks For a Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Law of the EU, 32/5
COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1123 (1995).
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shows that the realization of the internal market strongly depends on
enforceable individual rights. The same is true in national contexts,
and it is no different on the global level.
Yet, as in the European Union and in fact in any nation-state,
whether central or federalist, the advent of new technologies reminds
us that a constitutional doctrine needs to pay equal attention to the
structures by which rights are achieved and regulations are framed.
Their effectiveness depends on the overall legitimacy of the system.
We need to achieve adequate substance-structure pairings in interna-
tional trade regulation, just as no less than this is at the heart of do-
mestic constitutional law.47 We need to achieve, in other words,
adequate modes of multilateral governance.48 Such modes need to be
able to cope with increasingly complex issues, such as the ones dis-
cussed above. The regulation of those issues will often be novel and
no longer a mere extension and extrapolation of national rules. And
again, such regulations need to be legitimate in order to work.
The question therefore arises, in the context of the global trading
system of the WTO, whether the modes of decision-making tradition-
ally and currently shaped by the rules and comities of trade diplomacy
will be able to maintain adequate legitimacy in the face of increasingly
intrusive trade rules? Will diplomatic traditions alone with all the
skills and advances of international discourse and consensus still be
able to bring about a democratic legitimacy of future rules? Will the
principle of representation be satisfied by negotiations led under the
auspices of elected governments and implemented upon approval of
the results by democratic representation? Or is there a risk that the
shift of real power will erode such rules to the end that the primacy of
international law and of the founding principle of pacta sunt servanda
will not be honored in critical moments, very much to the detriment of
the international system? These are questions which cannot be an-
swered conclusively at the present stage, but caution recommends
skepticism and a search for new avenues.
On a global scale, we are still at the very beginning of a process of
designing good governance for future multilateral regulation of com-
plex technological trade-related issues. The post-war model of the
United Nations does not entail sufficient regulatory powers, and can-
not fully serve as a model to cope with the technological challenge and
47. For this approach, see Thomas Cottier, Constitutional Trade Regulation in National and
International Law: Structure-Substance Pairings in the EFTA Experience, in NATIONAL CONST-
TUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 409-42.
48. For the term see supra note 10.
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globalization. On the other hand, the process of European integra-
tion, as it moves toward federacy, often goes beyond what can and
perhaps should be reached on a global scale.
Novel approaches are necessary. John Jackson sets out a frame-
work of analysis for "constitution building" going beyond the claim of
the rule of law. Based upon what was achieved in the Uruguay Round
and the tradition of GAT', Jackson's framework includes issues of
how to take into account real power configurations, participation of
citizenry, the need for checks and balances. These and other issues
(such as the role of nonstate actors) need to be taken into account in
the shaping of the multilateral system which is likely to prevail as the
preferred mode of international governance in a complex world.49
Beyond these structural aspects, I believe new issues such as bio-
technology, technologically induced unemployment, or environmental
degradation indicate that the advances of science and technology
render it equally necessary to include an assessment of valuational
goals in the process of "constitution-building." Beyond individual
rights, legal and economic theory has to define fundamental values for
a globalized economy to which good governance has to respond be-
yond the economist's perception of market failures. The implications
of the doctrines of justice and equity in international law-liberal, dis-
tributive, and intergenerational 50-have to be examined for future
trade regulation and decision-making processes. And vice-versa, the
implications of a liberal trading system have to be assessed for the
future of international theory of justice. The same holds true for gen-
eral legal theory in the light of technology-driven economic globaliza-
tion. Much work lies ahead. Two hundred years after Kant's essay on
Perpetual Peace,51 leading twentieth century scholars and philosophers
only now are beginning to address the general problem of global jus-
49. John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round, World Trade Organization, and the Problem of
Regulating International Economic Behavior, Hyman Solaway Lecture on Business and Trade
Law, Centre for Trade Policy and Law. Carleton University, Ottawa, May 1994 (on file with
author). See also John H. Jackson. Reflections on Constitutional Changes to the Global Trading
System. 72 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 511 (1996).
50. Inter alia, such works include: PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW
WORLD (1990); MAR=rI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA THE STRUCTURE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989); RICHARD FALK, THE END OF WORLD ORDER (1983);
TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALrrY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES (1983); JULIUS STONE, VI-
SIONS OF WORLD ORDER: BETWEEN STATE POWER AND HUMAN JUSTICE (1984); TOWARD A
JUST WORLD ORDER: STUDIES ON A JUST WORLD ORDER (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1982).
51. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY (M. Campell Smith,
M.A. trans., 1903) (1795).
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tice beyond North-South relations 52-leaving the realm of society of
the pluralist and democratic nation-state which, so far, has provided
an often assumed framework of philosophical analysis.53
All this does not suggest that we need to strive for grand designs
in "constitution-building." The experience of GATF and the Uruguay
Round teach us that the building process is not revolutionary, but evo-
lutionary. Stone upon stone it was built and so it should continue.
This should equally apply to the impact and use of new technologies
and the values which need to accompany such use. It also should ap-
ply to the evolution of new, technologically-induced procedures of de-
cision-making, to which we finally turn.
B. Procedural Potentials and Risks of New Technology
Novel technologies not only pose difficult regulatory problems.
They equally change and shape the process of decision-making. Thus,
television fundamentally has altered political life and decision-making
processes, even if the formal setting of eighteenth century constitu-
tionalism has largely remained unchanged. The same is true for poli-
tics of international trade.
It is at this point that a reflection of the impact of new communi-
cation technologies on governance should therefore commence in the
process of building a global trade constitution. What are the poten-
tials, and the risks, of this new age in communications? Could new
means assist in establishing a wider participation shaping international
trade regulations, indeed shaping law in general? Is it conceivable
that domestic consultation will no longer be limited to a few interested
producers, but that it will be open to all interested, at home and
abroad?
Worldwide networks of interactive electronic communications
could offer new opportunities. Of course, there are risks of abuse.
There are practical problems: how to evaluate contributions by inter-
ested concerned citizens? There are problems of principle: should par-
ticipation rely on ownership of a particular and advanced technology?
What about societies where such technologies-even the telephone-
52. Jorg P. MUller, Kants Entwurf globaler Gerechtigkeit und das Problem der republikanis-
chen Reprasentation im Staats-und VOlkerrecht, in MELANGES J.-F. AUBERT (A. Auer & P.M.
Zen Ruffinen eds., forthcoming 1996).
53. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), and the very limitations of the model
in international relations and hierarchical societies; John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON
HUMAN RiHrrs: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 41-82 (Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley
eds., 1993). Similar observations may made for other leading scholars.
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are not yet sufficiently available? All these problems, however, should
not discourage the exploration of the potentials of the new-age tech-
nology. It is encouraging to observe that governments increasingly
resort to the Internet to submit draft proposals and draft legislation
for comments by the public at large.54
It is therefore conceivable that new technologies also will alter
the process of decision-making within WTO and other international
organizations. It may render them more transparent and more open
by means of new communication. This is not merely a matter of mak-
ing documents available on-line and abandoning policies of diplomatic
confidentiality where confidentiality is not required in order to serve
the public good. It is also a matter of exploring means of enhancing
interactions for the citizenry and other private subjects with their gov-
ernments and international organizations on problems and issues of
their concern. New technologies may assist in achieving a wide and
robust discourse among individuals and governments concerned along
the lines of ethics of discourse (Diskursethik)55 with a view to achiev-
ing consensus solutions under participation of all concerned and
therefore high legitimacy of global rules.
Again, it will not be a matter of creating grand designs. Rather
the very existence of these technologies exerts pressures on govern-
ments and the WTO to go public. The new technology is likely to
bring about and enhance the willingness on the part of executive or-
gans, be it in governments or in international organizations, to open
their decision-making processes to public scrutiny and input. In most
countries, not all citizens enjoy the right to examine all government
documents and accounts of policy discussions. With technology-
driven pressure to open such processes, supported by enhanced WTO
rules on transparency, and the usage of communication technologies
by governments, international organizations, and private actors, a new
international public can be created. Democracy could be fostered and
the legitimacy of international rules would be raised.
54. For example, the Swiss Government not only put the 1995 draft federal Constitution on
the Internet for comments by citizens, but also pending legislation. See (March 1996) <http://
www.admin.ch/ch/d/gg/pc/pendent.html>. This is an innovation since consultations before delib-
eration in parliament were formerly held only upon invitation. They were generally limited to
interested circles, political parties and cantonal governments. It remains to be seen to what ex-
tent Internet communication will change patterns in legislative consultations.
55. See JORGEN HABERMAAS, ERLAUTERUNGEN ZUR DISKURSETHIK (1991); JURGEN
HABERMAAS, FAKTIZITTAT UND GELTUNG: BErIRAGE ZUR DISKURSTHEOR1E DES RECHTS UND
DES DEMOKRATISCHEN RECHTSSTAATS (1992); JORG P. MOLLER, DEMOKRATISCHE GERECH-
"IGKEIT (1993).
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CONCLUSION
New technologies are, in my view, the most important driving
force in the process of globalization of the economy. They have a
profound impact on the future of international law as the elaboration
of international trade regulation is likely to become more complex.
They pose entirely new public policies issues, not familiar to the inter-
national trading system and international law so far. In the field of
biotechnology, it was seen that both ethical and other fundamental
issues are under debate. The relationship of technology and labor is
widely unknown in international trade law. Without addressing it, we
risk falling back into the nineteenth century "social question."
In new communication technologies, the shape of potential rules
is yet unclear, but it is likely that this technology will require more
rather than less international legislation. Such legislation will eventu-
ally lead to increased regulatory intrusion into domains formerly per-
taining to domestic affairs, legislation, and decision-making. These
shifts run the risk of eroding both traditional constitutional structures
of nations and the international trading system.
Besides paying attention to the quality of rules, new technologies
therefore increasingly force us to rethink the structures of interna-
tional rule-making in the interest of preserving long-term legitimacy
of rules necessary for a relatively free trading system. Long-term ef-
fectiveness depends on democratic legitimacy of rules, in particular if
they are expected to withstand times of difficulty.
It will not be a matter of simply adopting established principles of
constitutionalism and transferring them to the level of global govern-
ance. The international society is far from a world government, and
structures modelled after such an idea may not be successful. More-
over, leading doctrines and models of good governance, justice, and
democracy are all still much too focused on the nation-state and soci-
ety. Theories on global justice and equity, coping with the challenges
of the twenty-first century, are still in their beginnings. This, however,
does not exclude putting into effect in a process of "constitution build-
ing," step by step, those elements of democratic constitutionalism
which proved in long human experience to be the main pillars of long-
term legitimacy of rules: individual rights, open government, checks
and balances, wide open participation and robust debate in rule-mak-
ing; and combining this with successful traditions of diplomatic consul-
tation, negotiation, and consensus. New communication technologies
bear the potential to assist these processes and create a wider public
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which is necessary to achieving legitimate global rules. Thus, new
technologies create new and complex regulatory needs. But they also
offer new horizons and avenues in order to meet these needs in ade-
quate substance-structure pairings of an emerging global trade
constitution.
